Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88964 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-248
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
The existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office.
JEL: 
D72
D31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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