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Darracq Paries, Matthieu
Faia, Ester
Rodriguez-Palenzuela, Diego
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SAFE Working Paper Series 7
Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks' and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to incentive problems and liquidity risk (in the form of liquidity based banks' runs) which provides a link between endogenous bank capital and macro and policy risk. Our banks also invest in risky government bonds used as capital buffer to self-insure against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk.
liquidity risk
sovereign risk
capital regulations
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Working Paper

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