Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88253
Authors: 
Witt, Ulrich
Schubert, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Papers on Economics and Evolution 0803
Abstract: 
In constitutional political economy, the citizens' constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interest are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens' constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.
Subjects: 
Constitutional preferences
social contract
original position
innovation
risk preferences
JEL: 
D72
H10
O33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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