Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88253 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Papers on Economics and Evolution No. 0803
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
In constitutional political economy, the citizens' constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interest are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens' constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.
Schlagwörter: 
Constitutional preferences
social contract
original position
innovation
risk preferences
JEL: 
D72
H10
O33
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
203.04 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.