Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88095 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 117
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate how firms' incentives to acquire customer data for targeted offers depend on its quality. A two-dimensional Hotelling model is proposed where consumers are heterogeneous both with respect to their locations and transportation cost parameters (flexibility). Firms have perfect data on the locations of consumers while data on their flexibility is imperfect. When consumers are relatively homogeneous in their flexibility, in equilibrium both firms acquire customer data regardless of its quality. This increases profits but harms consumers. When consumers are relatively differentiated in flexibility, data acquisition incentives depend on its quality. Only if the data is sufficiently precise, both firms acquire it and their profits decrease, while consumers are better-off. Our model has particular relevance for location-based marketing such as in mobile telephony, where firms have near-perfect information on the proximity of customers but may have imperfect knowledge of other consumer characteristics.
Schlagwörter: 
Price Discrimination
Customer Data
Market Segmentation
JEL: 
D43
L13
L15
O30
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-116-8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
396.6 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.