Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87555
Authors: 
van Veldhuizen, Roel
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-038/1
Abstract: 
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. This paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, experienced low wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option.
Subjects: 
bribery
corruption
experimental economics
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
D73
C91
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
427.91 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.