Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87528
Authors: 
van den Brink, Rene
Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza
van der Laan, Gerard
Moes, Nigel
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-128/1
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river. Each agent has quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, where the benefit of consuming an amount of water is given by a continuous and concave benefit function. A solution to the problem efficiently distributes the river water over the agents and wastes no money. We introduce a number of (independence) axioms to characterize two new and two existing solutions. We apply the solutions to the particular case that every agent has constant marginal benefit of one up to a satiation point and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. In this case we find that two of the solutions (one existing and one new) can be implemented without monetary transfers between the agents.
Subjects: 
Water allocation
Harmon doctrine
concave benefit function
stability
externality
independence axiom
water claim
JEL: 
C71
D62
Q25
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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