Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87354
Authors: 
van den Brink, Rene
van der Laan, Gerard
Moes, Nigel
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-050/1
Abstract: 
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph.
Subjects: 
implementation
cycle-free graph game
tree game
hierarchical outcome
average tree solution
weighted hierarchical outcome
JEL: 
C71
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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