Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87244
Authors: 
Dobbelaere, Sabien
Luttens, Roland Iwan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-096/VII
Abstract: 
This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
Subjects: 
BC first-contract model
mediation
collective bargaining
union
non-binding contract
JEL: 
C71
J51
L20
K12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
221.14 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.