Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87027
Authors: 
Calcagno, Riccardo
Lovo, Stefano
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-023/2
Abstract: 
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call preopening. During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly observable and players payoffs only depend on the opening outcome, i.e. the action profile that is posted at the end of the preopening phase. We show that when the posting failures hit players idiosyncratically all equilibria of the preopening game lead to the same opening outcome that corresponds to the most sensible pure Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. By contrast preopening does not operate an equilibrium selection when posting failure hits players simultaneously.
Subjects: 
Preopening
equilibrium selection
bargaining
cheap talk
JEL: 
C72
C73
C78
G1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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