Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86911
Authors: 
Dahm, Matthias
Dur, Robert
Glazer, Amihai
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-068/1
Abstract: 
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.
Subjects: 
Lobbying
voting
special interests
influence
JEL: 
C72
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
204.62 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.