Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86768
Authors: 
Arping, Stefan
Falconieri, Sonia
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-036/2
Abstract: 
Strategic investors, such as corporate venture capitalists, engage in the financing of start-up firms to complement their core businesses and to facilitate the internalization of externalities. We argue that while strategic objectives make it more worthwhile for an investor to elicit high entrepreneurial effort, they can also undermine his commitment to penalize poorly performing entrepreneurs by terminating their projects. Based on this tradeoff we develop a theory of financing choice between strategic and financial investors. Our framework provides insights into the design of corporate venturing deals and the choice between corporate venturing and independent venture capital finance.
Subjects: 
Corporate Venturing
Soft Budget Constraint
JEL: 
G20
G24
G32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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