Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
de Haan, Laurens
de Vries, Casper
Zhou, Chen
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 08-041/2
Internet auctions attract numerous agents, but only a few become active bidders. A major difficulty in the structural analysis of internet auctions is that the number of potential bidders is unknown. Under the independent private value paradigm (IPVP)the valuations of the active bidders form a specific record sequence. This record sequence implies that if the number n of potential bidders is large, the number of active bidders is approximately 2 log n, explaining the relative inactivity. Empirical evidence for the 2 log n rule is provided. This evidence can also be interpreted as a weak test of the IPVP.
bids as records
number of active bidders
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
321.64 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.