Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86625
Authors: 
Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 06-070/1
Abstract: 
Limited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.
Subjects: 
insolvency
judgment proof
liability
bankruptcy
liability cap
JEL: 
K13
K32
L59
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
203.4 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.