Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86585 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 06-012/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We study an insurance model characterized by a continuum of risk types, private information and a competitive supply side. We use the model to investigate the welfare effects of discrimination (also known as risk selection). We postulate that a test is available that determines whether an applicant's risk exceeds a treshold. Excluding the highest risks softens adverse selection, but constitutes a welfare loss for the high risks. In contrast to a lemons market intuition, we find that aggregate surplus decreases when risk aversion is high. When risk aversion is low however, discrimination increases aggregate surplus.
Schlagwörter: 
insurance
adverse selection
risk selection
discrimination
JEL: 
D82
K29
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
292.73 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.