Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86319
Authors: 
Houba, Harold
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 06-095/1
Abstract: 
This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-offers model, a single optimization program significantly reduces the computational burden. Furthermore, water prices and property rights result from exploiting the Second Welfare Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Directions for future research are provided.
Subjects: 
International River Management
Negotiation Theory
Game Theory
Computations
Non-transferable utility
Property rights
Walrasian equilibrium prices
Applied General Equilibrium model
JEL: 
C72
C78
D50
D58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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