Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86252
Authors: 
Beniers, Klaas J.
Dur, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 04-065/1
Abstract: 
We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences.
Subjects: 
politicians' motivation
politicians' pay
political culture
electoral competition
coalition governments
reputation bashing
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
414.27 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.