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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 02-118/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimizing public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector. In line with empirical findings, our model implies that firms in the competitive market reach higher productivity and employ less workers than the public firm. Allocative efficiency therefore increases. Nevertheless, prices of the sector's output rise as competition between private firms for the best motivated workers leads to higher wage cost than under the public monopsony. Political support for liberalization may therefore be limited.
Schlagwörter: 
liberalisation
monopsony power
incentive wages
intrinsic motivation
JEL: 
H4
J3
J4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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