Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85928
Authors: 
Swank, Otto H.
Wrasai, Phongthorn
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 02-006/1
Abstract: 
We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made. Our most surprising result is that when there are no direct cost ofcommunication and communication can only help to identify the truth, more communication may reducethe probability that a correct decision is made. The reason for this result is that communicationmay aggravate the free-rider problem associated with collecting information.
Subjects: 
Uncertainty
Deliberation
Learning
Collective decision making
JEL: 
D78
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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