Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85786
Authors: 
Florax, Raymond J.G.M.
Mulatu, Abay
Withagen, Cees A.
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 03-080/3
Abstract: 
Is there a case to be made for preferential treatment of the exposed sector in an economy when compliance to an aggregate emissions constraint induced by an international environmental agreement is mandatory? This question is being debated in many countries, including The Netherlands, in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto protocol. We address this issue in a general equilibrium framework in this paper, and theoretically cover several market structures, including perfect competition, oligopoly and the large country case. Our main finding is that in many circumstances preferential treatment is not warranted from the point of view of maximizing social welfare.
Subjects: 
ecological dumping
general equilibrium
emissions constraints
Kyoto protocol
JEL: 
D6
F12
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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