Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85561
Authors: 
Janssen, Maarten C.W.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 00-019/1
Abstract: 
In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction withthe whole population. The dynamics is driven byimitative behavior. I show that for a large class of parameterscooperation will emerge if the population is large; if thepopulation is small, defection will prevail in the long run. Theresult contrasts with conventional wisdom which says that thelarger the population, the less likely cooperation will be.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary Game Theory
Local Interaction
JEL: 
C72
D62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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