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Engel, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
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Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter 2000/9
The German Basic Law is open for an interpretation that would allow the Constitutional Court to test the normative adequacy of most statutes. If the court does, it could be modelled as the supervisor of the legislator, i.e., of the agent of the people. The model predicts collusion between the supervisor and the agent, or too little control. Actually, constitutional lawyers are concerned by the opposite, too much control. The article purports to solve the puzzle, and to put the principal-agent model into a broader framework needed for normative recommendations.
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Working Paper

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