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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2013/3
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers' liability can be counterproductive.
Schlagwörter: 
bonus payments
bank bail-outs
bank management compensation
risk-shifting
underinvestment
limited and unlimited liability
JEL: 
J33
G21
G28
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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