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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2013/6
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We find that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to significantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself.
Schlagwörter: 
public goods
cooperation
centralized punishment
imperfect information
decentralized punishment
peer to peer punishment
JEL: 
C92
K42
H42
D03
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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