Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83957 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 25/2013
Verlag: 
Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank during the financial crisis from 2007-2012. Whereas the first two parts concentrate on asset bubble theory and the development of the housing bubble, the third part rates the performance of the Federal Reserve during the crisis. The chosen scoring model approach shows that the average performance of five specific measures taken by the Federal Reserve only ranks between fair and good. Comparing Stiglitz (2010) viewpoints with those of the Federal Reserve, this paper analyzes the federal funds rate, the bailout of AIG, the lending to Bear Stearns, the Term Auction Facility and the failure of Lehman Brothers. This paper argues that the resulting decisions were well intentioned but that the outcome was different from expectations because of missing regulations and restrictions. Furthermore, the structure of the Federal Reserve is examined and criticized.
Schlagwörter: 
Federal Reserve
financial crisis
housing bubble
monetary policy
JEL: 
E52
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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