Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83424
Authors: 
Gregor, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IES Working Paper 16/2008
Abstract: 
A government applying for a club membership may strategically delay entry to cope with the hold-up problem introduced by anticipatory investments of the private sector. In equilibrium of a two-period incomplete information game, we find that a pro-entry government may strategically delay to imitate an anti-entry government and thereby affect expectations of the private sector. The delay is more likely if the government has a good electoral prospect, is internationally weak, and is not considered to be too keen on entry. The model is related to the case of the Czech Republic where the government recently softened commitment in the euro adoption strategy.
Subjects: 
EMU
club enlargement
international unions
bargaining
JEL: 
D74
E42
F31
F50
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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