Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83404
Authors: 
Luňáčková, Petra
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IES Working Paper 38/2011
Abstract: 
This paper presents a model which focuses on differences between the competition policy of the EU and antitrust of the U.S. It introduces three versions - Neutral, American, and European. Two-stage game model takes the authority's perspective and describes options and behavior of antitrust officials when a firm engages in non-price vertical agreement (possibly restraint). Optimal behavior is expressed as expected income of the authority (EIA) which is a function of probability of wrong decision(s) in the course of action. It takes into account specific preferences, different types of errors, fear of those errors, and harm they might cause. Comparison shows some unnoticed features and results slightly in favor of the EU.
Subjects: 
competition policy
antitrust
non-price vertical restraints
National Competition Authority
game form
JEL: 
L42
L44
C79
D79
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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