Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/83191 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge No. 106-03
Verlag: 
Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, Siegen
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse tax competition with corporate profit taxes in a common market where tax revenues are allocated according to an apportionment formula. As a general rule, tax competition is sharper the higher is the tax elasticity of the apportionment formula which, in turn, depends on the properties of production technologies. In particular: (i) If labour input is fixed, tax competition is sharpest if apportionment is based on property shares, followed by the sales and payroll shares. (ii) If capital and labour are endogenous and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, tax competition under the property- and the payroll-share rule is sharper than under the output-share formula. Whether payroll- or property-share apportionment generates sharper tax competition, depends on factor elasticities.
Schlagwörter: 
Tax Competition
Formula Apportionment
JEL: 
D81
D21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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