Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/82771 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2004:19
Verlag: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare benefit levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own benefit levels. We solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game by utilizing a policy intervention; more specifically, we use a centrally geared exogenous placement of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities as an instrument. The IV estimates indicate that there exists a race-to-the-bottom and that the effect is economically as well as statistically significant; if the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare benefit level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its benefit level with approximately 59 SEK. This result is robust to several alternative model specifications.
Schlagwörter: 
Welfare benefit level
Strategic interactions
Race-to-the-bottom
Policy intervention
JEL: 
C33
D60
H73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
281.64 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.