Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81501 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 817
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Private equity owned firms have more leverage, more intense compensation contracts, and higher productivity than comparable firms. We develop a theory of buyouts in oligopolistic markets that explains these facts. Private equity firms are more aggressive in inducing restructuring compared to incumbents since they maximize a trade sale price. The equilibrium trade sale price increases in restructuring not only by increasing the profit of the acquirer, but also by decreasing the profits of non-acquiring firms. Predictions on the exit mode and on when private equity firms can outbid incumbents in the market for corporate control are also derived.
Schlagwörter: 
Acquisitions
Buyouts
Buy-to-sell
Buy-to-keep
Leveraged buyouts
Private equity
Take-overs
Temporary ownership
JEL: 
G24
G32
G34
L10
L20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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