Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81261
Authors: 
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 686
Abstract: 
A government wanting to promote an efficient allocation of resources as measured by the total surplus, should strategically delegate to its competition authority a welfare standard with a bias in favour of consumers. A consumer bias means that some welfare increasing mergers will be blocked. This is optimal, if the relevant alternative to the merger is another change in market structure that will even further increase the total surplus. Furthermore, a consumer bias is shown to enhance welfare even though it blocks some welfare increasing mergers when the relevant alternative is the status quo.
Subjects: 
Merger Control
Competition Policy
Consumer Surplus
JEL: 
L11
L13
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
183.32 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.