Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81218
Authors: 
Tangerås, Thomas P.
Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 589
Abstract: 
We construct a model in which a number of equally powerful ethnic groups compete for power by engaging in civil war. In non-redistributive equilibrium, ethnically homogeneous and ethnically diverse countries face a lower probability of civil war than countries with a moderate degree of ethnic diversity. The likelihood of conflict is maximized when there are two ethnic groups. When rent-extraction possibilities are not too big and society sufficiently ethnically homogeneous, there also exists a pacific equilibrium path sustained by redistribution from the ruling group to the out-of-power groups.
Subjects: 
Civil War
Ethnic Diversity
Redistribution
Dynamic Game
JEL: 
H56
J15
K42
N40
N47
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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