Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81206
Authors: 
Lindbeck, Assar
Palme, Mårten
Persson, Mats
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 660
Abstract: 
We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.
Subjects: 
Seniority Rules
Sick Pay Insurance
Firing Costs
Moral Hazard
JEL: 
H53
I38
J22
J50
M51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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