Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81181 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 682
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
There is diverging empirical evidence on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers: consumer prices (and thus presumably competitors' profits) often rise while competitors' share prices fall. Our model of endogenous mergers provides a possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that anticompetitive mergers may reduce competitors' share prices, if the merger announcement informs the market that the competitors' lost a race to buy the target. Also the use of first rumor as an event may create similar problems of interpretation. We also indicate how the event-study methodology may be adapted to identify competitive effects and thus, the welfare consequences for consumers.
Schlagwörter: 
Mergers & Acquisitions
Event Studies
Antitrust
In-play
Coalition Formation
JEL: 
G14
G34
L12
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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