Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80440
Authors: 
Grigoriadis, Theocharis
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, School of Business & Economics: Economics 2013/14
Abstract: 
In this paper, I test the effects of religious norms on the provision of public goods. My evidence is drawn from public goods experiments that I ran with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. I introduce three treatments, which I define as degrees of Eastern Orthodox collectivist enforcement: 1. Solidarity, 2. Obedience, and 3. Universal discipline. I argue for the existence of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy in the Russian bureaucracy that facilitates the delivery of public goods under conditions of universal discipline and the principal´s overfulfillment. Eastern Orthodox hierarchy is enforced through universal disciplinary monitoring, which induces collective punishment when the public good is not delivered. Contrary to conventional wisdom about freeriding in administrative institutions, higher ranks in Russian bureaucracies are associated with less freeriding.
Subjects: 
public goods experiments
bureaucracy
enforcement
Russia
religion
incomplete information
hierarchy
JEL: 
C91
C92
D72
D73
P21
P26
P32
P51
Z12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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