Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80043
Authors: 
Osterloh, Steffen
Heinemann, Friedrich
Kalb, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Sovereign Risk B09-V3
Abstract: 
There is a growing empirical literature studying whether fiscal rules reduce borrowing costs. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters. In our analysis of European bond spreads, we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies. These proxies refer to a country's past stability performance, government characteristics and survey results related to general trust. We find evidence that these preference indicators have an influence on risk premia and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules. Yet, the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules in countries with a historically low stability culture.
JEL: 
H63
H87
G12
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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