Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79985
Authors: 
Gobien, Simone
Vollan, Björn
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Risk Sharing in Developing Countries G20-V1
Abstract: 
Mutual aid among villagers in developing countries often is the sole possibility to insure against economic shocks. By using field laboratory experiments in Cambodian villages we study social cohesion in newly resettled and established communities which are both part of a land distribution project. All participants signed up voluntarily for the project, share comparable socio-demographic attributes and have similar preexisting network ties. We use a version of the solidarity game to identify the effect of a voluntary resettlement program on the willingness to help fellow villagers after an income shock. The voluntary resettled players only transfer between 41 % and 57 % of the amount the non-resettled players transfer to an anonymous community member. The solidarity differences are not only driven by lower expectations that the others would also help but are based on more selfish preferences among resettled farmers. Our findings are relevant for resettlement policies, because recipients might have to get additional compensation and formal insurance against the negative social consequences of resettlement until social cohesion is eventually re-established.
JEL: 
C93
O15
O22
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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