Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79968
Authors: 
Sliwka, Dirk
Manthei, Kathrin
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Labor Relations in Experiments E05-V3
Abstract: 
We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers allocated bonuses to their employees based on subjective assessments. In a subset of the branches, managers then obtained access to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort and financial performance. This productivity increase is mainly driven by larger branches and higher sales for non-core products which is well in line with a formal economic model on the optimal allocation of monitoring efforts under subjective evaluations in multitask environments.
JEL: 
C93
J33
D23
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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