Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79897
Authors: 
Stowasser, Till
Englmaier, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Empirical Public Choice A12-V2
Abstract: 
We provide causal evidence that German savings banks where local politicians are by law involved in their management systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles. The different timing of county elections across states and the existence of a control group of cooperative banks that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political connectedness allow for clean identification of causal effects of county elections on savings banks lending. These effects are economically meaningful and robust to various specifications. Moreover, politically induced lending increases in incumbent party entrenchment and in the contestedness of upcoming elections.
JEL: 
D72
D73
G21
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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