Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79863
Authors: 
Eisenkopf, Gerald
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Auctions and Leadership in Experiments E16-V2
Abstract: 
The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the members behavior. Different incentives schemes induce the managers to lead the groups into different directions but incentivized managers are less capable of inducing very high or low contest investments.
JEL: 
C92
D74
M12
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.