Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79851
Authors: 
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Prömpers, Henning
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Punishment and Debt in Experiments F05-V3
Abstract: 
With the help of lab experiments we study the impact of discharging insolvent debtors of their residual debt. We investigate the impact of different participation rules and the impact of different types of lenders. We find that higher participation rates encourage risk taking behaviour of borrowers. Higher participation rates also reduce the amount of moonlighting. Most importantly, institutional lenders can suffer more from moonlighting than private lenders.
JEL: 
C92
D14
D86
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.