Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79840
Authors: 
Rundshagen, Bianca
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Family and Fertility A11-V3
Abstract: 
Using non-cooperative game theory the effects of mediation on the divorce rate and on the utility of the spouses are analysed. Two kinds of mediation are considered: restricted mediation that reduces the costs of divorce and extended mediation that additionally may prevent divorces by demonstrating the potential for Pareto-improvements within marriage to the spouses. It is shown that restricted mediation not only may increase the divorce rate but that also both kinds of mediation are not necessarily welfare improving compared to the reference scenario without mediation.
JEL: 
D13
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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