Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79812
Authors: 
Rosar, Frank
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Issues in Auctions A16-V2
Abstract: 
I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and sellers who outsourced production subcontract with their respective suppliers. The focal equilibrium might exhibit bilateral outsourcing although outsourcing is modeled to have no direct positive effects. When a seller is able to extract his supplier s rent ex ante, the focal equilibrium exhibits bilateral outsourcing for any distribution of production costs satisfying a regularity condition.
JEL: 
D44
D82
L23
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.