Luehrmann, Melanie Chevalier, Arnaud Dolton, Peter
Year of Publication:
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Effort Compensation C07-V3
This paper examines field experiment in which we encourage the use of computer-based tests (quizzes) through a set of non-financial incentives and test their effect on effort and performance of students. Our identification strategy exploits cross-cohort experimental variation in assessment rules and within course variation in incentives to determine their impact on the performance in exams. We find these incentives to result in an increase in grades of 2.4 marks or about 4%. The performance effects are concentrated in the lower quartile of the grade distribution and can be attributed to increase quiz participation. Our results suggest that use of computerised assessment methods is not only a relatively low cost method of fostering continuous learning but also an effective tool in increasing student effort and performance.