Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79764
Authors: 
Heinz, Matthias
Drzensky, Frank
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Labor Relations in Experiments E05-V2
Abstract: 
We analyze whether a principal s decision to layoff an agent affects the performance of the surviving agents. To study the impact of the decision in isolation, we conducted an experimental principal-agent game. We find that agents reduce their performance by 37% as a response to the decision. Heterogeneity in principals decisions can largely be explained by different beliefs about how agents react to layoffs.
JEL: 
J63
C91
J82
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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