Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79757
Authors: 
Muthers, Johannes
Inceoglu, Firat
Doganoglu, Toker
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Auctions and Licensing F16-V1
Abstract: 
The literature on the licensing of an innovation has mainly focused on some speci c contract types. We show within the framework of a fairly general model that removing these contractual limitations will lead to extreme market outcomes. Speci cally, we nd that when the patentee can employ observable contracts that can condition on market entry, it can achieve the monopoly outcome. Furthermore, when the patentee can only use unconditional quantity forcing contracts, it captures the entire market, albeit not at monopoly price, via a single licensee. Our results point out to the signi cance, and perhaps the particularity, of observable, nonrenegotiable contracts.
JEL: 
D45
K11
L11
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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