Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79673
Authors: 
Duersch, Peter
Oechssler, Joerg
Schipper, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 13-1
Abstract: 
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatable in exact potential games. Our results apply to many interesting games including all symmetric 2x2 games, and standard examples of Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
Subjects: 
imitation
tit-for-tat
decision rules
learning
exact potential games
symmetric games
repeated games
relative payoffs
zero-sum games
JEL: 
C72
C73
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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