Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79630
Authors: 
Han, Martijn A.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2012-056
Abstract: 
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in the one-shot Cournot game. Allowing for infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation can increase firm profits as it improves cartel stability.
Subjects: 
strategic delegation
collusion
cartel stability
JEL: 
D43
L13
L20
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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