Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79515 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
cemmap working paper No. CWP04/13
Publisher: 
Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap), London
Abstract: 
We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles and binary games of complete information. We provide conditions under which we can recover both the interaction effects and the distributions of potentially correlated unobservables across goods in single-agent models and across players in games. We establish similarities in identification between these two models. Strengthening our assumptions for games, we provide an equivalence relation between discrete choice models for bundles and binary games that relies on the theory of potential games. Potential games are particularly useful for games of three or more players.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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