Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78383
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 34/2001
Abstract: 
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according to their relative performance. The results of the paper show that the outcomes of the two tournament types substantially differ. Especially, an employer will prefer J-type to U-type tournaments if the number of workers is large, whereas the opposite holds for small numbers of workers.
Subjects: 
collusion
human capital
relative deprivation
tournaments
JEL: 
J3
M1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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